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Abstract
This paper analyzes rigidities in the behavior of mark-up on petroleum products in
the New York area using a new set of high-frequency data. We use a methodology
that accounts both for deterministic and stochastic nature of petrol prices. The results
indicate that the adjustment to the long run equilibrium mark-up is non-linear with
adjustment speeds that are equal across regimes for two out of the three series ana-
lyzed. For one of the series the adjustment is beneficial for end consumers as we find
that prices fall faster than they rise.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the non-linearities in the behavior of cost items in the local market for
petroleum in the New York area. A SETAR model of the class proposed by Tong (1978)
and Tong & Lim (1980) is used to analyze the reversion of the mark-up on costs to its long
run equilibrium level. This approach allows us to check for the responses of petrol prices to
upstream price changes and verify the old claim that petrol prices ”rise faster than they fall”.
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Karrenbrock (1991) presents an impressive list of excerpts from newspapers quoting drivers
and officials who are outraged by the behavior of petrol companies.
Non-linearities in the speed of adjustment to the upstream prices have attracted sig-
nificant attention, both from applied researchers and from governmental agencies. Since
non-linearities in transmission might involve welfare transfer from agents downstream / end
users to companies upstream, the public agencies have vigorously pursued this issue. This can
be seen in a variety of reports associated with various agencies (see, e.g., reports by General
Accounting Office (1993) for US, Competition Bureau (1997) for Canada, and Monopolies
and Mergers Commission (1990) and Office of Fair Trading (1998) for the UK.
This phenomenon is more formally referred to as ”asymmetric price transmission”. The
graphic term usually used in this context is ”rockets and feathers”. This term is coined by
Bacon (1991) to describe fast increases in downstream prices following upstream increases
- rockets launched, and slow decreases following upstream price decreases - feathers falling.
The difference between symmetric and asymmetric price transmissions is illustrated in the
lower panel in Figure 1.
The existence of asymmetric price transmission implies that by postponing lowering
prices, agents artificially increase their margins causing the above-mentioned welfare transfer.
This usually forms the most typical motivation for formal research as it might result from
tacit or even formal collusion or serious problems with the degree of competition (see Godby,
Lintner, Stengos & Wandschneider (2000)).
Previous studies in the area have several common shortcomings. Firstly, as pointed out
by Frey & Manera (2005), researchers use aggregated petrol prices from a variety of sources,
which in turn gives rise to substantial inconsistencies in empirical results.1 Secondly, the
testing framework used implies that asymmetric price transmission is analyzed with respect
to changes in disequilibrium, instead of overall profitability (see section 4.3 for a more formal
discussion). Thirdly, no formal tests for non-linearity are performed, with the exceptions of
Frey & Manera (2005) and Godby et al. (2000). Finally, although von Cramon-Taubadel
& Mayer (2001) show that structural changes in the relationship between upstream and
downstream prices can be mistaken for the presence of asymmetric price transmission, except
for Reilly & Witt (1998), previous studies do not analyze the stability of the pricing relations.
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Our study employs a novel approach to examine the problem of asymmetries in petrol
prices. Firstly, rather than focusing on the behavior of downstream prices, we focus on the
behavior of mark-ups on costs. That is, we focus on the residual portion of the downstream
(retail) petroleum prices, not coming from the upstream wholesale stage. This allows us to
test for the presence of asymmetric price transmission and also to get some insights into the
behavior of adjustments of mark-ups on costs towards their long-run equilibrium level.
Secondly, the data employed offers significant improvement over the previous studies as:
(i) it is constrained to only one geographically distinct market (greater New York metropoli-
tan area); (ii) instead of using product aggregates, it covers three distinct kinds of petrol
(regular, midgrade and premium unleaded petrol); (iii) prices are quoted at a particular
point in time, thus representing the true market outcome, rather than an average over days
or weeks; (iv) it focuses on one transmission stage only (from New York harbor warehouses
to New York filling stations), which is more likely to result in a stable pricing relationship. As
demonstrated by Geweke (1978) aggregation over time can create a type of omitted variables
bias resulting from insufficient lag structure and can result in finding asymmetries in sym-
metric processes (see Bachmeier & Griffin (2003)). Our results show that the adjustment to
the long run equilibrium mark-up is non-linear and the speed of adjustment across regimes is
similar in most cases in both deterministic and stochastic switch cases. The price adjustment
seems to benefit suppliers rather than end consumers in most cases.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents the motivation for the research.
Section 3 summarizes the framework for testing for asymmetric price transmission. Section
4 presents an overview of data. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical non-linear
analysis. A brief summary and description of further research follows.
2 Motivation
2.1 Focus
Most of the research into pricing in petroleum markets has focused on the ”rockets and
feathers” phenomena (see section 2.2). The behavior of other costs is completely excluded
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from the analysis and profit margins are estimated indirectly, through an analysis of market
disequilibria (Abdulai (2002)).2 Our approach has its virtues in that it allows us to directly
address the question as to whether downstream consumers enjoy upstream price decreases
as quickly as they have to suffer upstream price increases. To be very specific about our
results and to avoid some of the problems noted by Frey & Manera (2005), we focus only on
one element of the market. Thus our approach allows us to examine the behavior of residual
costs. Focusing on this portion of the price allows us to examine:
• whether there exists asymmetric price transmission in that the mark-up portion of the
price increases faster than it decreases, and
• the nature of agents behavior by analyzing changes in the margins earned.
2.2 Overview of Previous Research
In perhaps the first study for the US market, Karrenbrock (1991) employed monthly data
for 1983-1990 to study the empirical relationship between wholesale and retail petrol prices
by regressing downstream price changes on positive and negative upstream prices (but disre-
garding cointegration issues). Both prices used are reduced by the sum of the federal petrol
tax and an average of the 50 states petrol taxes. He finds that the length of time in which
a wholesale price increase is fully reflected in the retail petrol price is the same as that of a
wholesale decrease for premium and unleaded regular petrol. The null hypothesis of symmet-
ric transmission is not rejected. Karrenbrock (1991) concludes that, contrary to a commonly
held belief drivers do benefit from wholesale petrol price decreases, as these are passed along
as fully and quickly as wholesale price increases.
Shin (1992) applies the model by Karrenbrock (1991) to crude-wholesale price trans-
mission, using monthly data over the period 1986-1992. He estimates a model with only
contemporaneous price effects (i.e. regressed upstream changes on downstream increases and
decreases. His results show that crude oil price variations have a symmetric impact on the
wholesale market).
Another study concerned with asymmetric transmission in the USA is by Borenstein,
Cameron & Gilbert (1997). For their analysis of price transmission between 1986 and 1992
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they use weekly data on prices at different processing levels. After testing for the homogeneity
of the contemporaneous change in the upstream price in all of the transmissions they adopt
two-stage least squares estimation. Using the framework provided by the Error Correction
Model (ECM), they confirm that retail petrol prices respond more quickly to increases than
to decreases in crude oil prices. The adjustment takes approximately 8 weeks in the case of
decreases in crude oil prices but only 4 weeks in the case of increases in prices of crude oil.
Balke, Brown & Yu¨cel (1998) extend the work of Borenstein et al. (1997) using a different
model specification. They use data from January 1987 through August 1996 on weekly prices
of West Texas Intermediate crude, spot prices for unleaded petrol in the New York harbor,
wholesale price of petrol and retail prices of self-service unleaded motor spirit with and
without taxes. They establish that upstream prices Granger-cause downstream prices at all
stages of the distribution chain. The results of their bivariate vector autoregressive models for
each pair of series suggest that with one exception (relationship between spot price of crude
oil and wholesale spot price of petrol) price shocks originate upstream and are transmitted
downstream. The null of symmetry in transmission is rejected in nine out of ten pairs of
price series, with the exception of spot retail transmission.
Godby et al. (2000) use weekly data on self-service regular and premium petrol net of
taxes and Edmonton par and Montreal Brent crude oil cost for the period January 1990 to
December 1996 for 13 Canadian cities. They apply the bootstrapping procedure proposed
by Hansen (1996) to test the null hypothesis of a linear formulation against an asymmetric
alternative. Only weak evidence of asymmetry is found. The finding is attributed to the
frequency of the data used and to the fact that previous studies use aggregate data on prices
from distinct regions.
Bachmeier & Griffin (2003) revisited data used by Borenstein et al. (1997) to compare
their results with those obtained using higher frequency data and larger sample (from Febru-
ary 1985 to November 1998). Their results indicate that daily retail prices adjust almost
instantaneously and symmetrically to crude oil price changes.
The research by Eckert (2002) is inspired by the cyclical behavior of downstream prices in
Ontario, Canada, which might be mistaken for asymmetries. The testing procedure follows
Borenstein et al. (1997), with the use of quarterly dummies and three level shifts to account
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for the first Gulf war. In this model, the null of symmetry in transmission is rejected.
After ascertaining that asymmetric transmission is present, the more sophisticated model
of price cycles is estimated with the use of a combined Probit-OLS procedure. The results
are interpreted as proof that changes in both regimes are dependent on upstream prices
and are decreasing functions of margins. Eckert (2002) concludes that asymmetries between
different portions of the price cycle described by Maskin & Tirole (1988) can be mistaken for
asymmetries in price responses.
Radchenko (2005) analyzes the link between oil price volatility and the asymmetric re-
sponse of petroleum prices to oil price variations. Weekly data from March 1991 to February
2003 are used to compute the impulse response functions to crude price increases and de-
creases. The results show that the response of retail prices to changes in crude oil prices is
asymmetric. Radchenko & Tsurumi (2005) apply a similar model to geographically aggre-
gated (region-wide) weekly data from March 1991 to February 2003 again to find welfare-
decreasing asymmetries in price transmission.
More recently, Noel (2007) uses Markov-switching regression to estimate the prevalence
of three regimes he identified - cost-based pricing, sticky pricing, and sharp asymmetric retail
price cycles. While focused on a cross-country setting, this paper represents an interesting
attempt to use purely stochastic methods to explain what triggers asymmetric patterns in
pricing behavior.
We build upon the existing literature, improving it in terms of data available (higher
frequency and lower geographical aggregation) and applied model (we corroborate the tradi-
tional deterministic models with a stochastic switching model). As such, we provide the first
available evidence on whether or not the “rockets and feathers“ holds in the New York area
at present.
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3 Traditional models of mark-up behavior
3.1 Relationship between prices
In order to analyze asymmetries in petroleum pricing it is necessary to explain the responses
of downstream prices to upstream changes. One model to capture changes in the downstream
prices is:
yt = yt−1 + γ0(y∗t−1 − yt−1) + νt (1)
where y∗t is the equilibrium downstream price, yt is the actual downstream price and γ0 is
adjustment speed (a shock would linger forever if γ0 = 0 and would be eliminated at once if
γ0 = 1). The equilibrium price (y
∗
t ) is established based on the long-run relationship between
upstream and downstream prices, i.e.:
y∗t = β0 + β1xt + t (2)
where xt is the upstream price, β0 is the constant (could be understood in terms of fixed
costs of transmission), β1 is the proportion of downstream costs passed through upstream
and t represents shocks to the system.
The approach proposed by Engle & Granger (1987) combines the two elements discussed
above and can be used to estimate the adjustment of downstream prices:
∆ˆt = γ0ˆt−1 +
m∑
i=1
γi∆ˆt−i + νt (3)
where ˆt are OLS residuals from level price equation, γ0 is the speed of adjustment, and∑m
i=1 γi∆ˆt−i is the lagged left-hand side variable.
In this two-stage cointegration analysis, the existence of the long-run relationship between
prices is tested under H0 : γ0 < 0. On the basis of that, it is assumed that upstream and
downstream prices are cointegrated, and that the residuals proxy the disequilibria to the
system. As pointed out by Abdulai (2002), this forms the basis for testing for asymmetric
price transmission.
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3.2 Non-linear Modeling
It is assumed that the residuals ˆt proxy the changes to margins earned (see Frey & Manera
(2005) for an overview of non-linear models of asymmetric price transmission). Based on the
analysis of those residuals, researchers look for the presence of asymmetric price transmission.
The analysis of asymmetric price transmission focuses on non-linear (piece-wise linear)
models of the threshold class first proposed by Tong (1978) and Tong & Lim (1980). The
idea is that (because of menu costs, transaction costs, search costs, etc.) pricing decisions
follow one of two possible regimes. While this might be an oversimplification, it allows us to
capture the basic non-linearities present in the data.
In this setting, the piece-wise linear model can capture the differences between regimes
and establish the presence of asymmetric price transmission. This piecewise linear extension
of eq. 3 into two different regimes can be represented by:
∆ˆt =

γ
(L)
0 ˆt−1 +
∑m
i=1 γ
(L)
i ∆ˆt−i + ν
(L)
t when ˆt−d < r
γ
(H)
0 ˆt−1 +
∑m
i=1 γ
(H)
i ∆ˆt−i + ν
(H)
t when ˆt−d ≥ r
(4)
where ˆt−d is the self-exciting threshold variable with delay set to d. The estimation of
threshold parameters and slope variables should be done via a grid search (as advised by
Hansen (1997) and Tsay (1998)), i.e. over all optimum values of thresholds r¯ and lags d¯ so
as to minimize the sum of the squared residuals from the fitted models, i.e.:
(r¯, d¯) = argmin
r¯,d¯
RSS(r¯, d¯) (5)
To avoid trivial results, the extreme values of threshold variables should be excluded from
the estimation (see Hansen (1997)).
The last remaining task is to test for the presence of piecewise linear adjustment, i.e. for
the presence of asymmetric price transmission. This boils down to testing of H0 : (γ
(L)
i =
γ
(H)
i ,∀i), i.e. of no significant difference between the parameters in each of the regimes. This
could be done using Wald test in the following form:
F12 = n ∗ RSS1 −RSS2
RSS2
(6)
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where n is the sample size, RSS1 and RSS2 are from eq. 3 and 4, respectively.
As noted by Hansen (1996), since the threshold parameter is not identified under the null,
the asymptotic distribution of F12 is not standard, but can be bootstrapped by the following
procedure. Denote u∗t ∼iid N(0; I), (i) draw the vector of u∗t , (ii) regress u∗t on right hand side
variables from eq. 3 and obtain the residual variance RSS∗1 , (iii) regress u
∗
t on right hand
side variables from eq. 4, obtain residual variance RSS∗2 , (iv) calculate eq. 6, repeat (i)-(iv)
a large number of times and use sample quantiles as the critical values.
In the setting described above, the process of eliminating the disequilibria determine the
adjustment of downstream prices to upstream price changes. In a non-linear framework, those
disequilibria are eliminated in regimes (L) and (H) with different speeds which gives rise to
non-linearities. One of such nonlinearities which attracts the public attention (i.e. when
prices rise faster than they fall) occurs when positive disequilibria (corresponding to times
of decreasing upstream prices) are eliminated at a slower pace than negative disequilibria
(corresponding to times of increasing upstream prices).
The modeling of mark-up on costs involves essentially the same traditional models de-
scribed above. The only difference is that it is assumed that the upstream costs are fully
passed on downstream (β1 = 1 which, given the vertical span between tiers, is a viable
assumption) so that the residuals between upstream and downstream prices (mark-up) are
comprised of retailers’ margins and other downstream costs. As such, eq. 2 becomes:
yt = pit + xt + νt (7)
where pit represents the mark-up, and the problem of adjustment of downstream prices
to upstream price changes (i.e. elimination of disequilibria) is simplified to the problem of
adjustment of pit to its long run level:
pit = pit−1 + γ0(pi∗t−1 − pit−1) + νt (8)
where pi∗t = α + t, since it is assumed that mark-up on costs is constant and does not
depend on upstream prices. Now the analysis of disequilibria in mark-up ˆt can be done using
the same procedure discussed with respect to equations 3 and 4.
9
4 Petroleum Product Prices
4.1 Overview of the Data
Weekly retail data from June 2000 until December 2005 are obtained from the U.S. Energy
Information Agency. The data used represent the entire population of prices provided by
the agency. The series represent prices charged for three grades of petroleum products in
approximately 900 retail outlets. The prices are published by 5 p.m. Monday, except for the
bank holidays, when the data are released on Tuesday (but still represent Monday’s price).
The reported price includes all taxes and is the price paid by a consumer at the pump as of
8 a.m. Monday.
Daily spot prices for the New York area from June 2000 until December 2005 come from
the U.S. Energy Information Agency. These series include wholesale prices quoted on the
day when retail prices are collected. When data on wholesale prices for a given day is not
available, the previous day’s prices are used.
The series analyzed include:
• downstream prices:3
– y1t - NYC / harbor regular all formulations / reformulated retail petrol prices net
of all taxes;
– y2t - NYC / harbor midgrade all formulations / reformulated retail petrol prices
net of all taxes;
– y3t - NYC / harbor premium all formulations / reformulated retail petrol prices
net of all taxes.
• xt - upstream prices - New York harbor reformulated regular petrol.
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the retail and wholesale prices over the sample period.
The New York market suits the purposes of the analysis as:
• the New York metropolitan area constitutes the economic hub on the East Coast;
• the bulk of trade in wholesale petrol takes place in that area (with NY harbor prices
being benchmark for the entire East Coast).
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The use of spot regular petroleum prices as a proxy for upstream prices is justified as
the regular petroleum is the most popular variety and as such forms the basis most retailers
use to price premium and midgrade. The mixing is done with the help of additives and
enhancements which increase octane index and help to differentiate petroleum products and
create company-specific fuels, such as Formula, Silver Eagle, etc. RFA (2006). As seen in
Figure 3, costs of wholesale petrol constitutes the main component of downstream prices. The
differences between upstream prices result mainly from costs of additives and enhancements
which are constant over time (this is confirmed by the analysis of product spreads, which do
not change by more than 3-5 cents over the sample period).
4.2 Data Analysis
Before moving to the application of non-linear models, the series are checked for the presence
of unit roots, direction of causality and identification of the cointegration vector. The price
series analyzed are not subjected to logarithmic transformation. Borenstein et al. (1997)
pointed out that using logarithms implies that wholesale-retail margin increases with the
upstream price. As an alternative he proposed using the raw data, which implies constant
nominal margins in the level equation. Borenstein et al. (1997, p. 312) claim that for short
samples with moderate inflation this assumption is justifiable.
The direction of causality is tested using the Granger test. Table 1 presents the results
indicating that upstream prices drive downstream prices. Thus, the null hypothesis that the
history of downstream prices cannot be used to explain upstream prices is not-rejected, while
the reverse is rejected.
The series are also tested for the presence of unit roots using the standard ADF. Table 2
presents the test statistics confirming that the series are integrated of order one.4
The existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between prices is tested using the
Phillips & Ouliaris (1990) test with truncation parameter set to 2. According to Phillips &
Ouliaris (1990, p. 165) this test should have better power than ADF and PP tests, at least
in larger samples. As shown in Table 3, the null of no cointegration is rejected for all price
pairs.5 The notion of upstream and downstream prices being related is supported in some of
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the earlier studies of US markets (see Karrenbrock (1991); Duffy-Deno (1996); Balke et al.
(1998); Energy Information Agency (1999); Borenstein et al. (1997) and Bachmeier & Griffin
(2003)).
After ascertaining that the series are cointegrated, eq. 2 is estimated for all series. Table
4 presents the results.
The results of the estimation indicate a good fit, as indicated by the values of the β1
coefficients. The β0 coefficients should be thought of in terms of constant mark-up, most
likely used to cover constant costs of product processing and distribution.
As the last step, we investigate the stability of the relationship given by eq. 10 using the
CUSUM test. The results indicate that the long-run equilibrium level of mark-up proxied by
α(j) is fairly stable over the sample size at 5%. Also the empirical fluctuation test, applied
in the OLS-CUSUM and recursive versions, supported the null of stable parameters. This
finding is important, as von Cramon-Taubadel & Mayer (2001) shows that the SETAR models
tend to mis-identify structural breaks as the signs of asymmetries.
4.3 Mark-up on petroleum products
We analyze the long-run mark-up on costs at a given transmission level, calculated as a
difference between upstream and downstream prices. This approach allows us to re-state the
research question - instead of asking what disequilibria trigger non-linearities, we analyze
what levels of profitability trigger different market responses. While both approaches are
equivalent in economic terms (assuming constant long-run profitability), our approach is
more intuitive and yields readily understandable results.
The proxies for the mark-up on costs on each product are calculated as:
pˆi
(j)
t = y
(j)
t − xt (9)
Figure 4 presents the mark-up earned on regular, midgrade and premium petroleum products.
To analyze the long-run equilibrium mark-up (equal to α), the following equation is
estimated:
pˆi
(j)
t = α
(j) + 
(j)
t (10)
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for each of the series (i.e., for j = 1, 2, 3). This equation assumes the markups to be constant
and equal to the difference between upstream and downstream prices, which given the results
of OLS estimation and stability of the pricing relationship is a valid assumption. Table 5
present the results. The results indicate varying profitability of distribution of the each
product, with the highest quality product receiving the highest mark-up.
5 Non-linearities in mark-ups
Residuals from eq. 10 are used to establish the reversion process for the mark-up proxies.
The dynamics are established by maximizing the AIC with the initial lags (m) set to 3
months.6 Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of equation eq. 3. The results
indicate fast adjustment (almost a quarter of disequilibrium is eliminated each period) and
similar dynamics as indicated by the lag structure.
As a next step, we estimate eq. 3 and eq. 4 for all three series so as to assess the speed
of adjustment of mark-ups to their long-run values. Table 7 summarizes results for the three
models estimated.7
Table 8 presents the results of estimation of eq. 4 for each of the series.
The results show that non-linearities in the pricing behavior do exist, as indicated by
the significant values of F12 statistics. However, the nature of non-linearities is interesting
in a number of ways. Results reported in Table 8 indicate that the immediate speeds of
adjustment (coefficients on ˆt−1) are:
• similar for regular and midgrade petroleum;
• much higher for regime H in the case of premium petrol.
The above results are confirmed by the F tests. In the first case, the F-test fails to reject
null hypothesis of H0 : γ
(j,L)
0 = γ
(j,H)
0 for j = 1 (regular petroleum) and j = 2 (midgrade)
with p-values equal to 0.5266 and 0.9717 respectively. In the second case, the F-test rejected
the null of equal speeds of adjustment with p-value of 0.0017.
In order to further corroborate the results, the model is also estimated in a stochastic
framework. The results are not significantly different from the ones reported. Appendix A
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presents the details.
Figure 5 presents the series analyzed (where solid circles correspond to H regime). The
trend visible is that mark-up reverts to its long-run level faster when the disequilibrium is
large and positive (so that the downstream prices are above their long-run levels).
Figure 5 also shows that fast-adjustment observations (those from the H regime) cluster
around dates when tax rates increase (marked as solid squares) but not with decreases in
taxes (triangles). This is puzzling as the taxes should be fully passed on to the customers.
Table 9 presents the percentage of observations falling into regime H within ±k weeks of the
date when taxes were increased. Again, the share of observations is double that predicted
under the assumption of uniform distribution of regime change (2 ∗ k/54).
6 Summary and Conclusions
The relationship between upstream and downstream prices of petroleum products in the
New York area and the behavior of mark-up on costs are analyzed using the cointegration
framework and SETAR(2) model. The results indicate that:
• the adjustment of mark-ups to their long run equilibrium level is non-linear in the sense
that two distinct regimes can be found in the revision process;
• the differences between the speeds of adjustments are greater for products with thin
mark-ups and the periods of faster adjustments are less frequent than those of slow
adjustment;
• a graphical analysis of the results suggests that the change of adjustment regimes is
more likely to happen shortly before or after increases in taxation.
The results are obtained using disaggregated data on prices of three distinct kinds of
petrol (regular, midgrade and premium unleaded petrol), constrained to only one geograph-
ically distinct market and one transmission stage (wholesale to retail). This represents a
significant innovation with respect to existing literature, as other researchers use heavily ag-
gregated data. The results in this paper are similar to those obtained by Bachmeier & Griffin
(2003) who also used disaggregated data. The results indicates that ”rockets and feathers”
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phenomena are not present over the sample period in the NYC. Further studies could extend
this approach to other geographic areas and potentially put drivers from other cities at ease.
A Appendix - Stochastic Regime Switching Approach
As discussed in Frey & Manera (2005), two different classes of regime switching models
(RSM) can be considered depending on the nature of switches between regimes. In the
deterministic RSM, e.g. a SETAR model, switches between states occur when a threshold
variable reaches a certain value. In the stochastic RSM, switches between states instead occur
at random. Often, an underlying discrete state Markov chain governs the switches from one
state to another (Hamilton (1989)). In this section, we estimate Markov switching models to
investigate the robustness of our results with respect to the class of regime switching models
considered.
The econometric specification resembles eq. 4:
∆ˆt =

γ
(L)
0 ˆt−1 +
∑m
i=1 γ
(L)
i ∆ˆt−i + ν
(L)
t when St = L
γ
(H)
0 ˆt−1 +
∑m
i=1 γ
(H)
i ∆ˆt−i + ν
(H)
t when St = H
(11)
where St is the state of the underlying Markov chain prevailing at time t. The model is
estimated following Hamilton (1994, page 692).
Table 10 reproduces Table 8 using stochastic switches. The only difference is that the
preferred model for premium quality does not include ∆εˆt−9 as a regressor.8 All coefficients
on the error correction terms are negative and significant. The magnitude of these coefficients
is roughly in the range −0.5 to −0.2. Further, coefficients on lagged changes in mark-up on
costs are always positive in the range 0.05 to 0.15 and significant in the L-regime, while
insignificant in the H-regime. All these results are very similar to the results obtained for
the SETAR model. The estimated parameters for idiosyncratic volatility show that volatility
unexplained by the model is at least twice as high in the H-regime than in the L-regime.9
This suggests an alternative interpretation of the separation between regimes; the L-regime
is characterized by smaller and less volatile shocks while the H-regime is characterized by
larger and more volatile shocks.
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Next, we present the results for the Wald tests of equal speeds of adjustment towards
long-run equilibrium in the two regimes, i.e. H0 : γ
(L)
0 = γ
(H)
0 . None of the Wald tests
suggest statistically different speeds of adjustment in the two regimes at the 95% level. The
p-values are 0.1393 (regular), 0.0508 (midgrade) and 0.0660 (premium). However, it should
be noted that for midgrade and premium qualities the test statistics are only marginally
insignificant. These results are similar to the results obtained for the SETAR model for
which no asymmetries where detected for regular and midgrade qualities (only for premium
quality there is some evidence of asymmetry).
To summarize, the overall picture does not change when switches between regimes are
stochastic instead of deterministic. We still find two regimes in the data, meaning that the
adjustment process is non-linear. Further, parameter estimates are almost always of the
same sign and magnitude and the same parameters are usually statistically significant. This
additional evidence strengthens our case for the presence of non-linearities in the adjustment
of mark-up on costs to their long run levels. This evidence also supports the conclusion
obtained using the deterministic framework - there is no need for government intervention in
the New York petroleum market.
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Notes
1The aggregation of prices can take the form of: geographical markets (e.g. on a national level), frequency
(e.g. monthly averages); types of products (e.g. aggregated unleaded petrol); market stage (e.g. from refiners
directly to filling stations); and, cost items (e.g. prices including taxes or net of country-wide taxation rate).
2The expectation is that suppliers are likely to squeeze retailers to reduce their (retailers) profit margins.
3Regular, Midgrade and Premium petroleum have the octane rating of (respectively) greater than 85 and
less than or equal to 90, greater than 88 and less than or equal to 90, and greater than 90.
4Critical values from Banarjee (1993, Table 4.2, p. 103).
5The p-values are interpolated from Phillips & Ouliaris (1990, Table Ia and Ib, p. 189).
6Changes in the values of m do not affect the results.
7In the model r(j) stands for threshold, d(j) is the delay parameter, F12 is the linearity test advocated in
Hansen (1996), calculated using 2000 replications. To avoid trivial results, in the grid the top and bottom
15% threshold values are disregarded.
8When the t − 9 lag is included, the only notable difference is that the coefficient for ∆εˆ(L)t−3 becomes
insignificant.
9Parameter estimates are not reported but available on request.
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Figure 1: Examples of symmetric (lower left panel) and asymmetric (lower right panel) price
transmission
Figure 2: Series analyzed.
Figure 3: Share of upstream prices in final product price.
Figure 4: Mark-ups on products.
Figure 5: Regime behavior - adjustment towards the long run equilibrium (left panel ∆pˆi
(j)
t ,
right panel pˆi
(j)
t .)
Table 1: Granger Causality tests for series analyzed.
F-statistic p-value
y
(1)
t → xt 0.02 0.89
y
(2)
t → xt 0.00 0.99
y
(3)
t → xt 0.01 0.93
xt → y(1)t 110.06 0.00
xt → y(2)t 111.51 0.00
xt → y(3)t 110.63 0.00
Table 2: ADF tests for series analyzed.
Variable Estimate Std.Error t-stat p-value
xt−1 −0.02 0.02 −1.64 0.10
∆xt−1 −1.16 0.06 −19.35 0.01
y
(1)
t−1 −0.00 0.01 −0.51 0.10
∆y
(1)
t−1 −0.80 0.06 −13.30 0.01
y
(2)
t−1 −0.01 0.01 −0.74 0.10
∆y
(2)
t−1 −0.80 0.06 −13.27 0.01
y
(3)
t−1 −0.01 0.01 −0.64 0.10
∆y
(3)
t−1 −0.63 0.09 −7.09 0.01
Table 3: Phillips-Ouliaris tests for the null of no cointegration in the series analyzed.
Cointegration Pair Statistics P-Value
y
(1)
t , xt −60.3520 0.01
y
(2)
t , xt −59.7279 0.01
y
(3)
t , xt −59.7693 0.01
Table 4: OLS estimation of the series analyzed.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
β
(1)
0 27.8661 2.0896 13.34 0.0000
β
(1)
1 0.9372 0.0199 47.03 0.0000
β
(2)
0 35.8471 2.1328 16.81 0.0000
β
(2)
1 0.9520 0.0203 46.80 0.0000
β
(3)
0 41.7649 2.1690 19.26 0.0000
β
(3)
1 0.9687 0.0207 46.83 0.0000
Table 5: Estimation of Long-run level of mark-up proxies pˆi
(j)
t .
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
α(1) 21.6146 0.6698 32.27 0.0000
α(2) 31.0668 0.6786 45.78 0.0000
α(3) 38.6502 0.6861 56.33 0.0000
Table 6: Estimation of linear model of adjustment for pˆi
(j)
t .
Variable Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
ˆ
(1)
t−1 −0.2455 0.0386 −6.36 0.0000
∆ˆ
(1)
t−3 0.1469 0.0567 2.59 0.0101
ˆ
(2)
t−1 −0.2404 0.0383 −6.28 0.0000
∆ˆ
(2)
t−3 0.1437 0.0569 2.53 0.0121
ˆ
(3)
t−1 −0.2410 0.0380 −6.34 0.0000
∆ˆ
(3)
t−3 0.1498 0.0570 2.63 0.0090
∆ˆ
(3)
t−9 0.0837 0.0573 1.46 0.1454
Table 7: Overview of SETAR models - structure of models
Variable d(j) r(j) F12
∆ˆ
(1)
t 11 8.902501 16.59906
∗
∆ˆ
(2)
t 11 9.322401 19.34938
∗
∆ˆ
(3)
t 8 10.61444 52.24798
∗
Table 8: Estimation of non-linear model of adjustment for pˆi
(j)
t .
Variable Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
ˆ
(1,L)
t−1 −0.2587 0.0414 −6.25 0.0000
ˆ
(1,H)
t−1 −0.1814 0.1147 −1.58 0.1147
∆ˆ
(1,L)
t−3 0.1879 0.0701 2.68 0.0078
∆ˆ
(1,H)
t−3 0.0752 0.0975 0.77 0.4408
ˆ
(2,L)
t−1 −0.2441 0.0405 −6.02 0.0000
ˆ
(2,H)
t−1 −0.2488 0.1258 −1.98 0.0490
∆ˆ
(2,L)
t−3 0.1816 0.0701 2.59 0.0102
∆ˆ
(2,H)
t−3 0.0688 0.0982 0.70 0.4842
ˆ
(3,L)
t−1 −0.1832 0.0410 −4.47 0.0000
ˆ
(3,H)
t−1 −0.5111 0.0947 −5.40 0.0000
∆ˆ
(3,L)
t−3 0.0939 0.0604 1.55 0.1214
∆ˆ
(3,H)
t−3 0.4183 0.1608 2.60 0.0098
∆ˆ
(3,L)
t−9 0.0774 0.0697 1.11 0.2683
∆ˆ
(3,H)
t−9 0.1329 0.1042 1.27 0.2035
Table 9: Changes in taxation and clustering of observations in regime H.
k Variable In regime H
±4 ∆ˆ(1)t 33%
±4 ∆ˆ(2)t 31%
±4 ∆ˆ(3)t 24%
±6 ∆ˆ(1)t 41%
±6 ∆ˆ(2)t 39%
±6 ∆ˆ(3)t 33%
±8 ∆ˆ(1)t 50%
±8 ∆ˆ(2)t 49%
±8 ∆ˆ(3)t 43%
Table 10: Table 8 Reproduced with Stochastic Switches
Variable Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
εˆ
(1,L)
t−1 −0.2053 0.0368 −5.57 0.0000
εˆ
(1,H)
t−1 −0.5375 0.2232 −2.41 0.0161
∆εˆ
(1,L)
t−3 0.1387 0.0686 2.02 0.0433
∆εˆ
(1,H)
t−3 0.0726 0.1466 0.50 0.6205
εˆ
(2,L)
t−1 −0.1752 0.0379 −4.62 0.0000
εˆ
(2,H)
t−1 −0.3871 0.1083 −3.57 0.0000
∆εˆ
(2,L)
t−3 0.1412 0.0652 2.16 0.0304
∆εˆ
(2,H)
t−3 0.1291 0.1280 1.01 0.3134
εˆ
(3,L)
t−1 −0.1787 0.0413 −4.33 0.0000
εˆ
(3,H)
t−1 −0.3673 0.1032 −3.56 0.0004
∆εˆ
(3,L)
t−3 0.1396 0.0662 2.11 0.0350
∆εˆ
(3,H)
t−3 0.1319 0.1308 1.01 0.3130
